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I.ARGUMENT 
A. Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Hilliards requested that they be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant 
to the contract between the parties, and, in the alternative, under LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-
121. Murphy Land argues that Hilliards are foreclosed from basing their request for 
attorney fees on the parties' contract because they did not argue that basis for fees to the 
district court. However, Hilliards are not asking this Court to review the district court's 
failure to award attorney fees and costs to them below; rather, they are seeking fees on 
appeal. 
Attorney fees on appeal are governed by I.A.R. 40 and 41, which require a party 
seeking fees on appeal to assert the claim as an issue in its first brief. The Idaho Appellate 
Courts have interpreted I.A.R. 41 to require the party seeking fees to state the basis for its 
claim. There is no requirement in I.A.R. 40 or 41 that the party requesting fees must have 
sought them below; nor do the rules mandate that the basis for fees on appeal must mirror 
the grounds below. Idaho cases do not support Murphy Land's argument, 1 nor does 
common sense. Indeed, it is not difficult to conceive of a case where the appeal was 
frivolous and the proceedings below were not, or where a party did not seek fees at the 
summary judgment stage because it did not prevail, but did request them on appeal when 
1 The case cited by Murphy Land, Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864; 204 P.3d 504 (2009), does 
not address the issue of attorney fees on appeal; rather it relates to issues not raised below. 
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asking to have the summary judgment overturned. Regarding contractual agreements for 
attorney fees, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Contractual terms providing for recovery of attorney fees incurred in actions 
to enforce the contract represent an election between the parties to place the 
risk of litigation costs on the one who is ultimately unsuccessful. This 
Court has held that these provisions are generally honored in ldaho.2 
Murphy Land's argument regarding Hilliards' request for attorney fees on appeal is 
without merit. 
B. Abuse of Discretion in Striking Affidavits. 
Murphy Land argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking 
portions of the affidavits of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark, James C. Hilliard and Robert F. 
Bennett. Murphy Land correctly states the legal standard for abuse of discretion: "A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issues as discretionary, 
(2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) 
reaches the decision through an exercise ofreason."3 However, Murphy Land's argument 
ignores the elephant in the room. Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard? The 
trial court clearly did not understand the limitations placed upon it in summary judgment 
proceedings when it stated that it was "allowed to assess credibility [ of witnesses]" at the 
2 Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 224; 220 P.3d 575, 580 (2009) (internal citations 
omitted). 
3 Zylstra v. State. No. 41421, 2014 Opinion No. 112, 2204 Ida. LEXIS 293 (October 29, 2014) 
( emphasis added). 
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summary judgment stage.4 The trial court on the record stated it did not find at least one of 
the witnesses credible, and that there was conflicting testimony on issues pertinent to the 
summary judgment.5 The trial court's statements make it difficult to have confidence that 
it applied the correct legal standard, and taint the entirety of its analysis in striking the 
affidavits. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Edmunds Affidavit was properly stricken for failure 
to comply with the trial court's scheduling order, the Clark Affidavit was not. Murphy 
Land alleges that the district court found that Clark was testifying as an expert, untimely 
disclosed. However, the transcript citation referenced in Murphy Land's brief states: "To 
the extent Mr. Clark is being offered as an expert, the Court is going to strike his affidavit 
in its entirety. He has not been disclosed as an expert. To the extent he is a layperson, then 
there will be a different standard and will allow the affidavit as to a layperson."6 
As the district court recognized, Mr. Clark was testifying as a layperson, not an 
expert. After making that finding, the district court went on to strike portions of Clark's 
affidavit as irrelevant, and refused to consider other portions on credibility issues. The 
trial court stated: "Now, the Court is going to note specifically that any farming that 
occurred on 2011, 2012, the Court is not going to allow Mr. Clark to rely on that. It has 
4 Tr., p. 124, II. 19-20. 
5 Tr., pp. 123-124. 
6 Tr., p. 36, 11. 11-17. 
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been determined that he was wrongfully in possession of that property during that time 
frame."7 Those statements, taken in conjunction with the trial court's later statements that 
it found Clark not credible, clearly call into question whether the trial court applied the 
correct legal standards in determining the motion to strike his affidavit, and whether the 
entire process was tainted by the trial court's mistaken belief that it was entitled to assess 
Clark's credibility at the summary judgment stage. 
C. Harmless Error. 
While admitting that the district court "took issue with Clark's credibility," Murphy 
Land argues that it was harmless error for it to do so. Murphy Land's argument ignores the 
well-established foundation for evaluating a motion for summary judgment. As the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: "It is well-settled that a trial court is not allowed to weigh the 
evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses on summary judgment."8 Violation of the 
basic rule against assessment of witness credibility cannot be harmless error. 
Reviewing the trial court's assessment of Clark's affidavit, it is clear that the 
court's judgment was colored by its belief that the witness was not credible. The court 
refused to consider testimony about the 2011 and 2012 crop years because it found Clark 
was in wrongful possession of the property during that time. It found Clark's testimony 
that the ground had been prepared for planting in 2011 to be irrelevant, notwithstanding the 
7 Tr., p. 37, 11. 1-6. 
8 Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730; 552 P.2s 776, 782 (1976). 
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fact that Murphy Land claimed it had expenses for ground preparation, to its damage. It 
refused to consider that testimony because "the reason that he knew the facts that 
predicated Bis that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to do so."9 
The trial court then stated that it would not allow Clark to testify because he "was 
wrongfully in possession." 10 The trial court refused to consider Clark's testimony 
regarding historical production of the land, omitted costs which had been historically 
incurred, acres actually farmed, and other matters of which Clark had personal knowledge. 
The entire process was colored, distorted and tainted by the trial court's belief that Clark 
was not credible, and that it could make that assessment at the summary judgment stage of 
the proceedings. 
D. Summary Judgment Standard. 
Murphy Land would have this Court disregard the well-established standards for 
summary judgment: that motions for summary judgment should be granted with caution, 11 
and that a motion for summary judgment should be denied if the relevant documents raise 
any question of credibility of witnesses or weight of the evidence. 12 Instead, Murphy Land 
posits that the trial court's credibility finding "might not be error" and should therefore be 
9 Tr., p. 40, II. 15-18. 
10 Tr.,p.39,11. 1-10. 
11 Bonz v. Sudweeks, I 19 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991); 
12 Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414; 353 P.2d 647,659 (1960). 
7 
upheld. It further asks the Court to excuse the trial judge's "sham affidavit" analysis 
because it may have been following dicta from the Court of Appeals decision in Keeven. 13 
However, as Murphy Land acknowledges, the Idaho Supreme Court decision in Major v. 
Sec. Equp. Corp. 14 came down several months before the trial court ruled on the summary 
judgment motion in the instant case. The Major Court specifically stated that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has never adopted the sham affidavit doctrine, 15 and that "a sham affidavit 
finding necessarily turns on a credibility finding as well as a finding of bad faith. That is 
beyond the power of the trial courts at the summary judgment phase."16 Nevertheless, the 
trial court clearly found that Clark's two affidavits contradicted each other, and utilized 
that finding both in striking portions of Clark's affidavit filed in this action, and in 
determining damages. 17 Those findings constituted error and an abuse of discretion. 
The district court ignored its duty to liberally construe facts in favor of Hilliards; 
indeed, it divested itself of that duty by improperly striking all of Hilliards' relevant 
evidence. The court impermissibly expanded its powers as the ultimate trier of fact based 
upon the Ritchie doctrine to include determination of witness credibility. The district court 
13 126 Idaho 290,298; 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994). 
14 155 Idaho 199; 307 P.3d 1225 (2013). 
15 Major, supra, 155 Idaho at 204. 
16 Id, I 55 Idaho at 205. 
17 Tr .. pp.116-117. 
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relied upon speculative evidence in determining damages, basing such reliance on its 
assumption that Hilliards had provided no rebuttal evidence; again, only because the court 
had stricken all ofHilliards' evidence rebutting Murphy Land's damage claims. 
Murphy Land's arguments would have this Court ignore its own well-established 
standards, and uphold a patently defective grant of summary judgment. They are flawed, 
and should not be relied upon. 
E. Tiegs Affidavit. 
Murphy Land argues that the trial court had no responsibility to sua sponte review 
the admissibility of the Tiegs Affidavit. However, that assertion ignores the rule that 
"evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must 
be admissible." 18 A trial court is empowered to review proffered evidence on its own 
motion. 19 In this case, the trial court recognized there may be a factual question about 
damages20 and that the damages claimed by Murphy Land may be speculative; however, 
the court then found that because Hilliards failed to "sufficiently refute" Tiegs' 
conclusions, the court had no alternative but to allow them to stand.21 Without re-plowing 
the ground regarding the Clark affidavit, which did refute Tiegs' conclusions, the trial court 
18 Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 785; 839 P.2d 1 I 92, 1199 (I 992). 
19 Id.; see also Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 44; 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1992). 
20 Tr., pp. 114-118. 
21 Tr. Pp. I 17-118, 11. 20-7. 
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was mistaken in its belief that it had no other alternative. The court's failure to exercise its 
gatekeeping function on the threshold question of admissibility of evidence, which should 
have led it to subject the Tiegs' affidavit to the same standard as were the affidavits of 
Hillards, was an abuse of discretion. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to understand and follow the proper standard for summary 
judgment in Idaho. It abused its discretion when it assessed the credibility of witnesses. It 
abused its discretion when it weighed Clark's previous affidavit against the one filed in this 
case. The trial court erred when it analyzed the affidavits proffered by Hilliards, and it 
erred when it accepted, without scrutiny, Murphy Land's affidavits. Summary judgment 
cannot lie under these circumstances, and the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
M. Karl Shurtliff 
Weldon S. Wood 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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